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A GENUINE CIVIL JUSTICE CRISIS?
Richard Marcus
University of California
Hastings College of the Law
When this Association had its eleventh Congress, in Vienna
in 1999, Professor Zuckerman presided over a session on 'Civil
Justice in Crisis' regarding studies that were later published as
a book.1 In his masterful overview of the various studies in the
book, Professor Zuckerman recognized that '[a] sense of crisis in
the administration of civil justice is by no means universal, but
it is widespread.'2 He discerned that a procedure system should
aspire to rectitude -- accurate decisions -- but also that no
society could spend all its resources pursuing that goal.3 He
also recognized that '[p]rocedural quality is to some extent a
function of the resources that we are prepared to invest in
procedure.'4 Given that tension, 'what lies behind different
methods of doing justice is really a difference in priorities.'5
In 1999, that tension seemed remote compared to the
challenges the world faces today. From the American perspective,
some say the 1990s were 'the best decade ever.'6 The tremendous
1

See Civil Justice in Crisis (A.A.S. Zuckerman, ed.,

1999).
2

Adrian A.S. Zuckerman, Justice in Crisis: Comparative
Dimensions of Civil Procedure, in Zuckerman, supra note 1, at 3,
12.
3

Id. at 8 (referring to 'the question of whether a wellordered state is under an obligation to provide the most accurate
civil procedure no matter how much it costs' and concluding that
'it would be absurd to say that we are entitled to the best legal
procedure regardless of expense').
4

Id. at 7.

5

Id. at 3.

6

See Kurt Andersen, The Best Decade Ever? The 1990s,
Obviously, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 2015: 'By the end of the decade,
in fact, there was so much good news -- a federal budget surplus,
dramatic reductions in violent crime (the murder rate in the
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changes wrought by the end of the Soviet Union were then less
than a decade in the past, and talk of a 'new world order' was
popular. For example, some say that the events of 1989 were, for
Germany, of comparable importance to the events of 1789 in
France.7 The European Union was gaining strength and moving
toward more unity; the Euro had begun to replace the national
currencies that were reflected in many of the national reports in
Professor Zuckerman's book.
Today things are enormously different. For Americans, the
date September 11 is burned into our memories. For many other
nations other dates and events have similar weight. This year,
the forces of intolerance and anarchy seem to be prominent, and
may be ascendent in many parts of the world. Governmental
arrangements that were gaining strength in 1999 are now under
challenge. Most significantly, starting in 2008 most of the
world has endured an extended economic crisis that is testing
many political bonds, particularly in the EU. Thus, the title of
this Congress -- 'Effective Judicial Relief and Remedies in an
Age of Austerity' -- seems singularly suitable. Austerity may be
the actual new world order.
So how much does procedure matter at such moments? At the
last Congress, in Heidelberg, I offered some initial thoughts
about the impact of austerity on procedure.8 At this Congress,
we will be able to focus on specific issues such as interim

United States declined by 41 percent) and in deaths from
H.I.V./AIDS -- that each astounding achievement didn't quite
register as miraculous.'
7

See Twenty Five Years On, The Economist, Nov. 8, 2014, at
54 (quoting the head of a foundation that studied East German,
and noting that the 'end of history' seemed possible).
8

See Richard Marcus, Procedure in a Time of Austerity, 3
Int'l J. of Procedural Law 133 (2013).
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relief,9 simplified procedure for smaller matters,10 measures that
affect personal mobility,11 coercive in personam orders,12 the
reform of institutions,13 and forms of relief.14
To set the scene for these detailed examinations, I propose
to provide some general comments, drawing in part on the
experience I've had since before the Vienna Congress in reforms
of American procedure.15 I will begin by reflecting on the
enduring sense of crisis that serves as a recurrent backdrop to
proposals for procedural change, and offer examples of stress
that austerity places on some procedural institutions. I will
then turn to the ways in which austerity bears on procedure, and
particularly how one might cope with austerity by changing
procedure to save money in operating a civil justice system. The
concerns that emerge include making the parties responsible for
as much as possible, rather than the court; the countervailing
and widespread impulse toward greater judicial control of the
lawyers; the possibility of saving money through use of

9

The first session of the Congress.

10

The second session of the Congress.

11

The third session of the Congress.

12

The fourth session of the Congress.

13

The fifth session of the Congress.

14

The sixth session of the Congress.

15

Since 1996, I have served as Associate Reporter of the
US Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, the
body that develops proposals to change the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Since the Vienna Conference, that activity has
included major amendment packages in 2000 (to discovery), 2003
(to the class-action rule), 2006 (for discovery of electronic
materials), and 2010 (revising expert discovery practices). In
2015, the US Supreme Court has before it another package of
reforms to discovery practice that may go into effect on Dec. 1,
2015, if adopted by the Court. Further changes to the classaction rule are now under study.
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technology; the 'social services' functions of court systems that
may produce substantial costs; and the possibility of simplified
procedures to save money in the operation of the court system.
This array of possible responses leads to some reflection on
the uses of austerity to further legal change. On that subject,
I will draw from Professor Aviram's recent book Cheap on Crime,16
which examines the way in which financial pressures have given
new force to humanitarian arguments for changing America's 40year embrace of mass incarceration. She cautions that saving
money and serving humanitarian goals are different things, and
adds that the alliance of these arguments is questionable and may
be short-lived. It seems to me that a somewhat similar issue may
confront us as proceduralists -- financial arguments may be
advanced to further objectives that are really not particularly
connected to reducing financial burdens on civil justice systems.
Both with regard to civil justice and criminal justice, then,
might one hesitate to regard austerity as a prime reason for
serious changes.
I. PROCEDURE AND THE CRISIS MENTALITY
Professor Zuckerman touched a nerve with this crisis theme
sixteen years ago. Rahm Emanuel, Chief of Staff in the White
House during President Obama's first term, allegedly said: 'You
never let a serious crisis go to waste. And what I mean by that
is that it's an opportunity to do things you think you could not
do before.' Similar sentiments have been attributed to Winston
Churchill and others.
The history of procedural reform in America, and probably

16

Hadar Aviram, Cheap on Crime (2015).
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elsewhere, lends strength to this notion.17 The Judicature Acts
in England in the 19th century reflected such concerns.18 The
American reforms of the 20th century began with a 1906 speech by
Roscoe Pound declaring a crisis of popular dissatisfaction with
US procedure.19 More recently, unhappiness with procedure in
America has produced very aggressive statements about its
potential impact on the US economy and its economic future. A
prominent example was the 1991 Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in
America,20 produced by a presidential commission headed by the
Vice President. This document began by asserting that 'America
has become a litigious society' and citing a finance professor
who 'estimated that the average lawyer takes $1 million a year
from the country's output of goods and services.'21
Such assertions do not withstand careful examination. For
one thing, as contributions to Professor Zuckerman's book pointed
out, other countries experience high rates of litigation. As
Professor Gottwald pointed out in that book regarding Germany:
'In percentage terms, the courts here are made use of to a
greater extent than anywhere else in the world.'22 Professor

17

See Richard Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The
Prospects for Procedural Progress, 59 Brooklyn L. Rev. 761, 76267 (1993) (discussing 'the crisis mentality' as it affects
discussions of changing procedures).
18

See Edson Sunderland, The English Struggle for
Procedural Reform, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 725 (1926).
19

See Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction
With the Administration of Justice, 29 Rep. of the A.B.A. 395
(1906).
20

President's Council on Competitiveness, Agenda for Civil
Justice Reform in America (1991).
21

22

Id. at 1.

Peter Gottwald, Civil Justice Reform: Access, Cost, and
Expedition. The German Perspective, in Zuckerman, supra note 1,
at 207, 220.
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Cadiet, his successor as president of this Association, noted in
the same book that France was experiencing '[a]n increasing
ideology of compensation, transforming any trouble into a claim
for damages against someone else. . . . France is moving slowly
towards an American-styles litigation society.'23 Similar
reports abounded about other countries.24
Moreover, despite the perception abroad, much work on actual
US litigation rates shows that this widely- held impression of US
litigiousness is overstated.25 Surely the American legal
profession's cost cannot approach what the Council on
Competitiveness said in 1991, for then it would signify a drain

23

Loic Cadiet, Civil Justice Reform: Access, Cost, and
Delay: The French Perspective, in Zuckerman, supra note 1, at
291, 307).
24

See, e.g., Yukio Hasebe, Civil Justice Reform: Access,
Cost, and Expedition. The Japanese Perspective, in Zuckerman,
supra note 1, at 235, 236 ('The civil justice system was faced
with fierce criticism in the 1980s. The critics said that civil
justice was slow, expensive, and hardly comprehensible to the
ordinary person.'); Sergio Bermudes, Administration of Civil
Justice in Brazil, in Zuckerman, supra note 1, at 347, 357 ('Most
courts are unbearably overloaded'). K.D. Kerameus & S.
Koussoulis, Civil Justice Reform: Access, Costs, and Delay: A
Greek Perspective, in id. at 363, 369 (noting that the 'vast
majority' of first-instance decisions are appealed).
On the other hand, the reports on some other countries were
different. Professor Blankenburg reported that '[t]he Dutch
pattern of litigation is amazing' because the rate of litigation
is so low. Erhard Blankenburg, Civil Justice: Access, Cost, and
Expedition. The Netherlands, id. at 442, 454. Professors
Marques, Gomes, and Pedroso noted, somewhat ruefully: 'Little
propensity to litigate, especially be individuals, is a sign of
passivity which may be a trait of the Portuguese national
character.' Maria Manuel Letao Marques, Conceiao Gomes & Joao
Pedroso, The Portuguese System of Civil Procedure, id. at 413,
421.
25

See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of
Disputes: What We know and Don't Know (And Think We Know) About
Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. Rev.
4 (1983).
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on the country of about $1 trillion, given that the country
probably has one million lawyers. Indeed, in her 1999 report on
procedural reform on Japan, Professor Hasebe noted that the
problem in that country was that there were too few lawyers.26
Nonetheless, the theme continues to be prominent in the US,
just as it seems to have been prominent in other places in the
1990s. As I noted in 1993 regarding the situation in the US, 'it
is hard to find anyone who is fundamentally satisfied with the
course and condition of civil litigation today.'27 But it also
seems that crisis talk may be something that is viewed as
necessary to get the attention of legislatures or other potential
reformers, who might otherwise not take procedure too seriously.
In 1922, for example, a witness told a committee in the US
Congress that the weakness of American procedure 'is one of the
things that is making Bolshevists in this country.'28 When there
is a real crisis, however, there is not much room to strengthen
the crisis rhetoric because it has been used so often in times of
relative normality.
II.

THE AUSTERITY CRISIS AND PROCEDURE

It seems to be widely agreed that many countries now
confront austerity in a way that was not true, or at least was
not appreciated, in 1999, when Professor Zuckerman's book

26

See Hasebe, supra note 24, at 255-56.

27

Marcus, Babies and Bathwater, supra note 17, at 763.

28

See Procedure in the Federal courts: Hearings on H.R.
2377 and H.R. 90 Before the House Committee on the Judiciary,
67th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 13 (1922), quoted in Stephen Subrin, How
Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in Historical Perspective, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 909, 959 (1987).

ISTANBUL.WPD

8
appeared. It contains a mention or two of austerity policies,29
but that is far from central.
Often the current austerity problem is traced to the tumult
caused by the financial crisis beginning in 2008. From a more
general perspective, that view may overlook deeper causes. Some
sociologists regard austerity as the inevitable consequence of
the advent of the 'welfare state' in many places after World War
II. In the view of Professor Pierson, for example, those
countries have been approaching a state of 'essentially permanent
austerity' since the 1970s.30 In 1996, he announced that '[t]he
much-discussed crisis of the welfare state is now two decades
old.'31 As we have seen in many places, the result often is an
effort to guard one's own place in the budget -- 'Let them cut
somebody else's budget' is the reflexive call of the day; 'my
budget is too important.' Thus, the challenge for proceduralists
is to explain why our budget is sacrosanct.
As the overall theme of this Congress makes clear, austerity
has begun to affect procedure. That reality surely appears in
the US, and others can easily add examples from their own
countries. As the various sessions of this Congress unfold, the
consequences and limits of an era of austerity might well be kept
in mind. An abiding reality may be that, compared to other
governmental costs that feel the pinch of austerity, it may be a
challenge to urge that the civil justice system -- and procedure
in particular -- should be regarded as more important than, for
29

See Blankenburg, supra note 24, at 455 (referring to
'[a]usterity policies' in the Netherlands regarding eligibility
for legal aid).
30

Paul Pierson, Coping With Permanent Austerity: Welfare
State Restructuring in Affluent Democracies, 43 Revue Francaise
de Socologie 369, 370 (2002).
31

Paul Pierson, The New Politics of the Welfare State, 48
World Politics 143, 143 (1996).
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example, pensions, health care, and schooling. It is perhaps the
nature of austerity to pit such interests against one another.
That may explain the appeal of 'across the board' austerity
schemes. As a recent article in the Association's journal
recognized, 'the main puzzle is how to meet the contemporary
objectives of adjudication in view of civil litigation's material
constraints.'32 This point reflects a point made by Professor
Zuckerman -- that proportionality is the new byword in many
judicial systems.33
The point is also clear in various recent American
expressions about austerity and our judicial system. In his 2013
year-end message, for example, Chief Justice Roberts decried the
impact on the federal judiciary that budget cuts had produced:
'Unlike most Executive Branch agencies, the courts do not have
discretionary programs they can eliminate or postpone in response
to budget cuts.'34 Note that this message says that the judicial
branch should be preferred to other governmental activities that
are 'discretionary.' As a consequence of flat budgets, the Chief
Justice also reported, the US federal courts had to reduce
staffing by over 3,000 employees, to the lowest staffing level
since 1997, despite workload increases during this period.35

32

Sergio Cruz Arenhart & Gustavo Osna, Complexity,
Proportionality and the 'Pan-Procedural Approach': Some Bases of
Contemporary Civil Litigation, 4 Int'l J. of Proc. Law 178, 191
(2014).
33

Zuckerman, supra note 1, at 48 (referring to 'the
development of a new philosophy of procedure' based on 'the idea
of proportionality').
34

Chief Justice John Roberts, 2013 Year-End Report on the
Federal Judiciary, at 5. This report is available at:
www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2013year-endreport.pdf
35

Id. at 5-6.
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The story in the California state courts is similar. The
new President of the State Bar of California, for example, noted:
'The impact of court budget cuts has been profound and will
continue to affect us in a number of ways if we are not able to
stabilize the finding for our courts. . . . [T]here have been
enormous delays in the court system such that motions that would
routinely take a few weeks can now take over a year to be heard
and resolved.'36 One reaction has been to close some outlying
courthouses, and there is a debate about whether to sell these
buildings or retain them in hopes of holding court in them
again.37 Proposals have been made to increase court fees for at
least some litigants to raise more revenue, and there have also
been proposals to curtail use of some procedural mechanisms to
cut down on delay and cost.38 Meanwhile, Governor Brown of
California could appoint new judges, but they would have no staff
due to staff cuts caused by austerity.39
Such situations present the conundrum what government should
prefer during times of austerity (or, perhaps, eras of
austerity). There may be other needs that might claim priority.
To take one example, a newspaper story recently reported that in

36

Interview with Craig Holden, Civil Justice Reform, The
Metropolitan Corporate Counsel, Nov. 2014, at 17.
37

See Saul Sugarman, Some Want to Sell Shuttered
Courthouses But Details are Messy, San Francisco Daily Journal,
Dec. 17, 2014, at 1 (explaining that hundreds of thousands of
dollars are being spent to maintain courthouse buildings that may
never again be used).
38

See Paul Jones, Judges, Lawyers Consider Bill to
Eliminate Many Demurrers, San Francisco Daily Journal, Feb. 5,
2015, at 1 (describing legislative proposal to abolish or
eliminate the demurrer, a move that challenges the sufficiency of
the complaint and is asserted in as many as 20% of all cases).
39

See Saul Sugarman & Paul Jones, Brown Has Judges to
Appoint, but Courts Lack Staff For Them, San Francisco Daily
Journal, April 25, 2014, at 1.
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Greece 'private' nurses from other countries are available for
'rent' to replace nursing services hospitals can no longer
provide. 'Greece's dire finances have gutted its health care
system. Universal coverage effectively ended under the austerity
measures imposed under the terms of the country's bailout.'40
Admittedly, the situation in Greece may be extreme, but the
pressures likely exist in many places.
One reaction to this sort of tension is to stress that civil
litigation is an essential public service. That is at the heart
of Professor Genn's 2008 indictment of the budget cutbacks in the
UK on various court services, and increases in some court fees.41
She despairs that 'an accepted principle is the need to control
expenditure on civil justice,'42 a willingness she puts down to
governments' acceptance that there is a crisis.43 But one might
regard this argument as embracing a view whose time has passed -that what Professor Zuckerman called the 'rectitude' of judicial
decisions is a value above all others, including particularly the
cost of arriving at that decision. That surely seems to be the
thrust of Professor Sorabji's new book.44
It is, frankly, extremely difficult to devise guidelines on
which services that public entities provide should be regarded as
redundant when austerity arrives. Consider the recent complaints

40

Danny Hakim, Greek Austerity Spawns Fakery: Playing
Nurse, N.Y. Times, feb. 8, 2015, at 1.
41

See Hazel Genn, Judging Civil Justice, chp. 2 (2010).

42

Id. at 58.

43

See id. at 63 ('It is remarkable how willing governments
around the world have been to assert the existence of crises and
proposed solutions without any evidence base or means of
assessing the effect on access to justice').
44

See generally John Sorabji, English Civil Justice After
the Woolf and Jackson Reforms: A Critical Analysis (2014).
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of the new United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
about his annual budget of $265 million per year. Stressing that
this amount is only 3% of the entire U.N. budget, he says that
'[i]t's a trifle. You hardly convince yourself that it's a
serious commitment by states, given the enormity of the task
before us.'45 Much as one must recognize the importance of human
rights, one probably has to recognize also the importance of many
other things the U.N. spends money to try to accomplish.
At least some American arguments for preferring public
expenditures on courts seem as implausible as the Council on
Competitiveness's 1991 suggestion that every American lawyer
takes $1 million out of the US economy.46 Consider a 2012 report
on the economic impact of reduced funding of the California
judicial system.47 The summary of the report is that 'reductions
in civil judiciary funding were expected to produce declines of
$13 billion in business activity due to decreased utilization of
legal services, $15 billion in economic losses associated with
increased uncertainty among litigants, damage to the Los Angeles
and California economies amounting to 150,000 lost jobs, and lost
local and state tax revenue of $1.6 billion.'48 It would seem
that boosting spending on the judiciary is a sure route out of
recession. But boosting such spending does not always seem to
produce such effects. For example, in 1999 Professor Cadiet
noted that the French judicial budget had doubled in the 18 years

45

Light
A8.
46

Nick Cumming-Bruce, U.N. Rights Chief Says He'll Shine a
on Countries Big and Small, N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 22015, at
See supra text accompanying note 21.

47

See Nels Pearsall, Bo Shippen & Roy Weinstein, Economic
Impact of Reduced Judiciary Funding and Resulting Delays in State
Civil Litigation (ERS Group) 2013.
48

Id. at 1.
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since 1981.49 He added that it nonetheless made France a 'poor
relation' in such expenditure to the UK and Germany, and that the
budget for veterans was larger.50 He did not claim that boosting
the French judicial budget to equal levels would solve France's
economic problems.
Although some say justice is a 'pearl beyond price,' that
surely is not a solution to the challenges of modern austerity.
At the same time, it is also surely true that having a
functioning judicial system is an important value for a society.
At some point, it may really be a burden on the economy. Thus,
The Economist recently reported that '[t]he sluggishness of civil
justice is a big reason why the Italian economy is still not
growing.'51 A 2011 New York Times story said that the
difficulties businesses in the EU confront when trying to collect
amounts due by using the court systems of other EU countries
caused them to stop doing business across borders. EU officials
said that 'at least 55 billion Euros a year is simply being
written off, much of it because businesses find it too daunting
to press expensive, confusing lawsuits in foreign countries.'52
EU officials estimated that more effective judicial systems would
generate 60 billion to 140 billion Euros a year in additional
trade. At least sometimes, problems with the public court system
actually drive away even potential local users; thus, a recent
story reported that many Afghans are turning to Taliban courts

49

Cadiet, supra note 23, at 208.

50

See id.

51

Justice Denied?, The Economist, July 19, 2014, at 47.
the story quotes a commercial diplomat as saying: 'There are
defense companies that export all over Europe, but not to Italy,
because they believe that what they make will be counterfeited
and that to get redress will take many years.'
52

Suzanne Daley & Stephen Castle, Slow Payers Hinder Trade
in Europe, N.Y. Times, April 18, 2011.
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because the public courts are corrupt.53
So as you consider the discussions in the sessions of this
Congress that follow, one thing to keep in mind is the extent
that the consequences of budget cuts for the judicial system can
be regarded as more severe than the consequences of other budget
cuts. If they suppress trade, perhaps they are.
III.

WAYS TO SAVE MONEY ON A JUSTICE SYSTEM

Like other governmental institutions, then, courts are
likely to find themselves engaged in belt-tightening for some
time. There are probably various ways to do so, and some of them
involve matters at the heartland of procedure and provide
contrasts among differing national systems. It may be useful to
have those differences in mind as one considers the various
topics covered in the sessions of this Congress.
A.

The BYO Approach

Every American university student learns the term 'BYO' soon
after enrolling -- it means 'bring your own' liquor to parties.
American litigation is largely a BYO operation. Plaintiffs must
do some investigation before filing complaints,54 but the
pleading standards are relatively forgiving compared to the
standards of most countries, and even those relaxed standards are
applied only if the opposing party makes a motion challenging the
pleading. The parties are free to demand discovery without any

53

Azam Ahmed, Taliban Justice Gains Favor As Official
Courts Fail, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 2015, at 1.
54

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) (regarding the lawyer's
certification that there is good ground for the complaint based
on an investigation reasonable under the circumstances).
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prior judicial review or even knowledge.55 The judge has no duty
(or even right) to investigate the circumstances of the case but
only to respond to motions brought by the parties. The parties
must list their evidence before trial begins,56 and they may not
use evidence that was not so disclosed.57 Although the trial
court can permit undisclosed evidence to be used if the use is
'harmless,' it is also true that the court should not permit that
if it would be 'harmful' to a party's case. Given the broad
willingness of courts in other countries to consider new evidence
on appeal and attempt to ensure that the decision is justified
under all the evidence, this is a singular commitment to the BYO
approach.
That BYO approach even extends to the legal rules to be used
to decide the case. In jury trials, the judge usually need not
instruct the jury on any ground unless requested by a party to do
so, and a party unhappy with a jury instruction may not seek
reversal unless it argued in the first-instance court that the
proposed instruction was wrong.58 In court trials, the judge
must make findings of fact and enter conclusions of law,59 but
the judge may direct the parties to submit proposed findings and
conclusions and may adopt those as the court's ruling.60 What

55

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d) (commanding that discovery
requests and responses not be filed in court).
56

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3) (regarding pretrial
disclosures).
57

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) (commanding that evidence
not disclosed be excluded).
58

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 51.

59

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a).

60

See, e.g., Counihan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 357,
363 (2d Cir. 1999) (reviewing practice and upholding the district
court's adoption of proposed findings submitted by the winning
party).
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this means, in large measure, is that it is not the court's
responsibility to discern the proper legal rules to be applied to
the case.
At the appellate level, this BYO approach continues. Only a
small proportion of cases ever reach the point where an appeal is
allowed because the US functions with a 'final judgment' rule
that denies appellate review until after the end of the entire
case.61 Because most cases are settled (even after trial
begins), that point never arrives in those cases. And the
appellate court will defer to the trial court on many matters
that are considered 'discretionary,' including admissibility of
evidence, and will also affirm on 'harmless error' grounds even
if it concludes that the trial court made a mistake.62
Finally, many disputes in the US are now subject to
mandatory arbitration agreements that the US Supreme Court has
enforced quite vigorously in recent years. These realities of
the American legal system may lie behind our Chief Justice's
objection that it is a relatively lean operation without much
that can be cut.63
Yet another aspect of the American legal system in recent
decades bears on costs borne by governments. As was explored
during one session at the Heidelberg Congress in 2011, the US
relies heavily on private enforcement of public norms.64 There
are many reasons why those from different legal systems might

61

See 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

62

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 61.

63

See supra text accompanying note 34.

64

See Stephen Burbank, Sean Farhang & Herbert Kritzer,
Private Enforcement, 17 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 637 (2013) (revised
version of the submission during the Heidelberg Congress).

ISTANBUL.WPD

17
question this feature of the American system. But one
consequence is that the budgets of public regulatory agencies may
be much smaller because they do not have to support the cost of
enforcement in the same way public agencies in other countries
do. A recent bill adopted by the California Legislature provides
an illustration. The bill authorizes private lawyers to sue
businesses for violating employment laws, and one report is that
'the law serves to take pressure off regulators who investigate
alleged labor law violations by making it easier for the
plaintiffs' bar to pull businesses into the courtroom with
private companies.'65 Beyond that, some state attorneys' general
are hiring private lawyers to bring cases in the name of the
state on a contingency basis. A New York Times article reports
that these public officials explain that 'with tight budgets,
hiring outside lawyers is often the only tool they have to
achieve rough parity with the army of corporate lawyers who are
aggressively trying to blunt the lawsuits.'66
Altogether, there may be many reasons why other countries to
not adopt similar measures. To take the state attorneys general
who hire private lawyers as a starting point, a former attorney
general was quoted as warning that this practice 'seriously
threatens the perception of integrity and professionalism of the

65

Laura Hautala, Subcontractor Law Seen as a Coming Boon
for Plaintiffs Lawyers, San Francisco Daily Journal, Feb. 10,
2015, at 1.
66

Eric Libpon, Lawyers Create Big Paydays by Coaxing
Attorneys General to Sue, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 2014, at A1. The
story goes on to quote an attorney general who explained that
'lawsuits against major corporations or industry sectors can
require the hiring of expert witnesses and produce hundreds of
thousands of pages of documents that need to be reviewed. All of
this comes at high cost, and outside lawyers can foot the bills
up front.'
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office.'67 Moreover, it may be that private enforcement can
hobble public enforcement; in a recent case the settlement of a
private class action was held to bar action by the California
Attorney General seeking remedies for California citizens on the
ground that they were bound by the class-action settlement on
principles of res judicata.68
But the more challenging orientation is likely the BYO
approach. To take a competing example from Professor Zuckerman's
1999 book, the report on Portugal said that judges 'have the duty
to compensate for the omissions of the litigants, in furtherance
of the principle of the discovery of the material truth.'69 Much
more generally, many (perhaps most) countries permit new issues
and evidence to be presented on appeal even though not raised
before the court of first instance, often due to the commitment
that the appellate courts ensure that the outcome was correct
whatever the skill or attentiveness of the litigants and their
lawyers. This pursuit of what Professor Zuckerman called
rectitude of decision may come at a fairly high price.
For those seeking savings on the public costs of litigation,
some compromises may become necessary. At least from an American
perspective, it sometimes seems that the greater judicial
responsibilities in other systems come with a serious cost. For
example, writing in the mid 1980s, an American professor focused
on the requirement then that a Brazilian judge review and approve
the complaint before the plaintiff can serve the defendant: 'The
procedure for filing a complaint practically guarantees
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substantial delays in starting a lawsuit, particularly if the
courts are congested. Unlike the United States, Brazil does not
permit the plaintiff's attorney to have the complaint served
until the judge has reviewed and approved it, a process that can
easily consume several months, and even more if an interlocutory
appeal is taken. Since the work done by the judge on his own in
reviewing the law can be done more easily after hearing from
defendant's counsel, the [Brazilian code's] requirement of
judicial approval prior to service of the complaint seems an
inefficient expenditure of judicial resources.'70 No doubt there
are reasons for requiring advance judicial scrutiny of proposed
suits, and some Americans urge that the US recognize them,71 but
that judicial effort involves a court burden compared to the BYO
approach.
B.

The Countervailing Push for Judicial Management

Another feature that Professor Zuckerman noted in 1999 in
many countries was what he called 'the universal assertion of
judicial control.'72 That activity surely typifies American
judicial activity. Indeed, it may to a significant extent be a
consequence of the BYO aspect of American procedure. More than a
decade ago, at a procedure conference in Japan, I offered the
view that judaical management was the American response to the
increased latitude American lawyers have under our BYO
70
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and approved the complaint violates due process because it
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procedure.73 Similar emphasis on judicial control was introduced
into UK procedure by Lord Woolf's reforms in the late 1990s. In
various civil law jurisdictions it seems that such management has
been a feature of judicial activity for a long time.
The question now may be whether the courts can undertake
this new (or continuing) supervisory role while coping also with
budget cuts. This sort of question may profitably be kept in
mind during the various sessions of this Congress -- to what
extent are measures that deal with the problems covered likely
also to impose serious burdens on courts?
C.

The technology fix

I work near Silicon Valley; Twitter and Uber both have their
headquarters a few blocks from my office. Probably more than
most assembled here, I find myself on the front lines in the
Digital Age. In 2010, the Association held a full conference on
the role of electronic technology in civil procedure, with the
optimistic subtitle: 'New Paths to Justice from Around the
World.'74 Surely the pervasiveness of electronic communication
has grown appreciably since then.
I confess myself skeptical about many claims that this
technology will revolutionize legal or judicial practice and make
it better.75 Others, notably Richard Susskind of the UK, expect
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that there will be a revolution in law practice. Those favorable
on high-tech solutions agree; a recent article in Law Technology
News is subtitled 'How Technology Will Disrupt, Transform, and
Save the Legal Profession.'76
For present purposes, it should suffice to note this
possibility and urge that those attending this Congress consider
how technology may solve, or at least ease, the problems that are
the focus of the various sessions of the Congress. Certainly
there was a need for progress in 1999; as the report on Brazil in
Professor Zuckerman's book observed: 'Most courts of justice in
Brazil lack essential equipment to accomplish their tasks. Many
tasks are performed manually which, in more developed systems,
would be automated or simply obsolete. The pages of files of
proceedings are still numbered an stamped by hand. Every new
piece of paper is actually sewn to the files of the case with
needle and thread.'77 In the US federal system, all filings are
made electronically, and accessible online 24 hours a day.
Surely moves in this direction could produce savings even if they
involved an initial capital outlay. Whether such measures would
solve other problems is a topic of ongoing interest.
D.

The 'social services' roles of judicial systems

By and large, procedure rules in the US are designed to
accommodate litigants who bear the responsibility for their
litigations. That is, at heart, the BYO attitude. But American
courts surely have considerable responsibilities that go beyond

L. Rev. 263 (2009); Richard Marcus, The Impact of Computers on
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this classic vision of a civil lawsuit. One way of regarding
these additional responsibilities is that they are 'social
services' performed by the courts. They may be more burdensome
for courts than the classic lawsuit, but important ingredients of
the role of courts in society.
Such things as divorce, child custody, foster care,
guardianship of the disabled, commitment of the incompetent to
public institutions and the like often depend on proceedings in
court. A new US example involves children fleeing from warfare n
Central America.78 These proceedings often do not closely
resemble the classic adversary proceeding. Even where they do
have the trappings of such a proceeding, they may be delayed and
burdened by judicial budget cuts. In California, for example,
simple divorces, even where lawyers are involved, now take much
longer to complete.79 These proceedings can also be abused; a
recent report on New York courts suggested that nursing homes
were using guardianship proceedings to seize control of their
patients' assets when disputes arose about paying for their
services.80 Almost certainly, courts in other countries

78

See Patricia MacLean, Children at the Gates, California
Lawyer, October 2014, at 12 (describing statutory provisions for
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undertake similar responsibilities; and almost certainly those
responsibilities are a considerable burden for those courts. As
Professor Cadiet observed in his 1999 report, '[t]he judge in the
modern welfare state is required to take charge in a vast range
of difficult individual or collective situations.'81
A related development in the US is the increasing prominence
of litigants without lawyers. Some countries do not permit
people to handle their own cases in court, but in a time when
austerity means that legal aid is more limited it is likely to
become increasingly true that they will. This burden has come to
typify family law matters in a number of states in the US. In
some, children are assured of state-provided legal representation
(because they are minors) while their parents are not.82
More generally, as the Chief Judge of the New York Court of
Appeals reported, '[c]ases with unrepresented parties take more
[judicial] time,' and family court proceedings present a
particularly difficult example.83 A California judge agrees:
'Sacramento Presiding Family Court Judge James Mize says selfrepresented petitioners can get stuck if they don't know how to
write a marital settlement agreement or draft a final judgment
that's acceptable to the court -- or how to get onto a calendar

husband contested some bills; only after much delay and cost was
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for a hearing.'84 But for courts to provide the needed direction
is an added burden, and can conflict with the impartiality that
are to bring to adversary proceedings.
Several of the sessions in this Congress involve judicial
responsibilities that might be regarded as within the 'social
services' category, so this set of problems should be kept in
mind. In terms of the larger societal problems that these
responsibilities address, it may be that judicial investment can
actually produce societal savings. For example, a recent study
of an effort to provide legal representation for some such
litigants can actually save governmental money: 'For every
dollar spent representing families and individuals in housing
court, the study concluded, the state would save $2.69 in other
services such as emergency shelter, health care, foster care and
law enforcement.'85 It may be that this is an exceptional
situation, but it offers a different sort of argument for
expenditure on civil litigation from the one Professor Genn seems
to have endorsed.86
E.

Small claims and simple procedures

One way to save money is to simplify. Simplicity may even
have aesthetic appeal for procedure reformers.87 Complexity may
strike many as the justifying opacity and mainly enriching those
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schooled in the art, in this case the art of lawyering. Perhaps
the best way to deal with that complexity is to simplify.
Some have seen the evolution from 'rigidity' to
'flexibility' as an iron rule of procedural development.88
Cutting through the red tape is often a good way to get to the
heart of the issue, while lawyers often seem to have a fixation
on the peripheral and unimportant. If we insist that judges pay
attention to the lawyers' fixation with complexity, we will
probably place a large burden on the litigation system. So it
may be best to dispense with the formalities and mete out justice
on the quick and on the cheap.
That is, in a sense, the notion behind small claims courts
in America -- to enable the parties to present their positions to
the judge and have the judge decide promptly. In California,
lawyers are forbidden to appear in small claims court, which has
jurisdiction over disputes involving up to $5,000.89 Proceedings
are informal, and may resemble television shows like 'Judge
Judy.' Regular judges need not be hired to handle such matters,
which can (with the consent of the parties) be heard by members
of the State Bar.90 So there may be a savings even on judicial
salaries, although there are also provisions calling for the
courts to provide advice to litigants.91
Meting out justice in this way can be cheap, and it may be
satisfactory to the litigants in ways in which the 'complex'
88
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regular court system is not. So a similar simplification of the
regular court system might both provide better satisfaction to
the users of the system (the parties, not the lawyers) and reduce
the cost of operating that system. Some efforts along this line
have been made. In California, for example, for 'limited civil
cases' (claims up to $25,000) there is an 'economic litigation'
procedure that provides assurances of simplified and expedited
resolution.92 Simplified procedures for the federal courts also
have been considered.93
To date, these methods have not siphoned off much of the
expense of running the regular court system. One reason may be
related to something addressed in the next section -- lawyers'
profound mistrust of change. American federal judges who have
experimented with simplified procedure to assure a prompt and
expeditious trial have found almost no takers among members of
the bar.94 According to Professor Zuckerman's 1999 collection,
however, the experience with 'special courts' in Brazil have been
very successful: 'People can litigate at very low cost, in an
informal manner, and see immediate results from their judicial
initiative. Paradoxically, the highly successful experience of
these special courts, all called "small cases courts", is highly
likely to have a positive impact on traditional proceedings.'95
As California's rule against lawyers in small claims courts
suggests, there may also be a cost of such arrangements. Perhaps
the court system must provide advice for unrepresented litigants,
92
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for otherwise it is difficult to see how equality of arms can be
assured. Of course, equality of arms is not something any court
system can truly ensure; those with more resources are likely to
have a corresponding advantage in litigation. Nonetheless,
simplicity alone is likely not to be a simple solution to the
problems of austerity.
Recent US experience with 'small claims' procedures for
criminal cases shows that there are justice concerns to be kept
in mind, as evidenced by a story in the New York Times.96 'Over
the past 20 years, U.S. authorities have made more than a quarter
billion arrests, and they add 12 million each year.' 75% or so
of those are for misdemeanor charges -- involving fines or short
jail terms. The courts do not have the financial capacity to
provide lawyers for all these defendants, and they manage this
avalanche of cases by moving very fast. 'In Florida, misdemeanor
courts routinely disposed of cases in three minutes or less . . .
[A] district judge on an average day has over 100 misdemeanor
cases on his or her docket -- or one every four minutes.'
Assembly line justice is far from the ideal to which either
criminal or civil justice should aspire, but austerity may push
both in that direction.
IV. HOW CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM WORKS IN AN AGE OF AUSTERITY
Much as Professor Zuckerman's 1999 collection seemed to urge
reform of procedure, it did not offer a particularly optimistic
view of the promise of that sort of reform. Professor
Leubsdorf's contribution to the collection had the melancholy

96

John Emschwiller & Gary Fields, Justice Dispensed in
Minutes as Petty Crimes Clog Courts, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 2014, at
A1.

ISTANBUL.WPD

28
title 'The Myth of Civil Procedure Reform.'97 Professor
Chiarloni's report on Italy reinforced Professor Leubsdorf's
message with a poignant example.98 He traced a century of
procedural reform in Italy, but reached a distressing conclusion:
'[W]e must face a paradox: quality of service has fallen during
procedural modernization in Italy.'99
This gloomy experience may suggest that something
'cultural,' not just the nature of procedures, affects the
efficient functioning of institutions. Indeed, the divergence in
results of similar reforms seems not to depend on what the
general procedural orientation of the country involved is. In
the UK, Lord Woolf's reforms of the mid 1990s did not solve all
the problems they meant to solve, and they were followed in a bit
more than a decade by Lord Jackson's examination of costs of
litigation. Only time will tell whether the Jackson reforms
fully solve the problems Lord Woolf set out to overcome.100 As
Professor van Rhee noted a decade ago, 'legal practice and
procedural culture are important issues when it comes to
establishing the merits of a particular procedural model.'101
But 'culture' alone is likely an inadequate explanation for
failures or shortcomings of reform efforts. In most places,
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judicial and legal establishments are extremely resistant to
change. In 1999, Professor Zuckerman called this phenomenon 'the
obstructive influence of lawyers' vested interest.'102 But it
probably goes beyond pure self interest, or at least is clothed
in other garb. In the US, recent efforts to curtail modestly the
lax pleading and broad discovery that make American procedure
'exceptional' have prompted extraordinarily vehement outbursts
that suggest what could be called 'procedural polarization.'103
That sort of reception has long been the lot of procedural
reformers. In the mid-19th century, the main reform effort was
known as the Field Code; by 1910, an American court referred to
'[t]he cold, not to say inhuman, treatment which the infant Code
received from the New York judges.'104
At the same time, it can happen that austerity enables
changes that have long been sought but not succeeded. To take an
prominent example, as all know America has for the last
generation embraced mass imprisonment as a solution to criminal
behavior. Wave after wave of 'mandatory minimum' sentences and
'three strikes' legislation have earned the US the status (along
with others such as North Korea) as the nation with the largest
proportion of its citizenry in prison. During the same time, the
crime rate has plummeted, which prompted some who favor the mass
imprisonment effort to claim credit. But crime rates have
plummeted throughout most of the post-industrial world, so that
argument is hard to support. Indeed, it has sometimes seemed
that enthusiasm for imprisonment (even the death penalty) has
been impervious to data on the effects of these policies.
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Enter austerity, and there suddenly is a possibility that
these policies will change because many are now realizing how
expensive it is to imprison so many. As Professor Aviram has
explored in her new book Cheap on Crime,105 although for decades
humanitarian effort has failed to persuade US policymakers and
the American public that mass incarceration is a bad idea, the
arrival of the financial crisis prompted many to reconsider the
policy due to the huge financial costs it imposes. She calls
this new attitude 'humonetarism' -- receptiveness to humanitarian
concerns based on monetary concerns.
For Professor Aviram, the new humonetarism provides what may
be a welcome opportunity to pursue objectives she long has
favored on essentially humanitarian grounds: 'Speaking about
financial prudence has freed politicians, administrators, and
even law enforcement agents to advocate for policies that go
against the grain of a four-decade-long project of mass
incarceration. And while localities vary in their response to
humonetarian discourse, political campaigns for change, such as
death penalty abolition, scaling down of the war on drugs, and
habitual offender law reform, have been successful in many state
in which such reforms failed prior to the financial crisis. . . .
[T]he emphasis on cost has made it possible to raise arguments
that have long ago lost their public appeal.'106
Although she welcomes this opening, she is also worried that
the humanitarian impulses will lose force when the monetary
concerns abate: 'If the main justification for policy changes is
financial, how likely is it that these policies will be reversed
when punishing more harshly becomes more financially
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sustainable?'107
There may be, at best, a tenuous connection
between the financial concerns and the underlying policy
concerns. For those who do not covet changes being promoted on
austerity grounds, this is a reminder that those who exploit
austerity may manage to overcome well-founded resistance to
change while pursuing goals essentially unrelated to austerity.
The US can provide a possible example here as well in relation to
one of its distinctive procedural attributes -- broad discovery.
Opposition to broad discovery goes back to a decade after it was
introduced in 1938 by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and one could say that the basic terms of the debate
have not changed even though the advent of what we call EDiscovery have changed the terms used in discovery.108 These
issues have been with us through thick and thin.
But a new strand has been added to the argument -austerity. In 2011, a committee of the US Congress held a
hearing on whether US discovery was harming the competitive
ability of US companies.109 It is hard to resist the conclusion
that this argument is being advanced by those who have long
favored the cures that they now urge be adopted to deal with the
challenges of austerity and globalization. Yet the argument that
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American business has suffered because of US discovery is
difficult to credit. If that is so, one would expect that
America would still be mired in recession while the EU, with its
alternative civil litigation arrangements, would be leaping ahead
economically. That obviously has not happened, and it is
difficult to conclude that significant changes to US discovery
would provide a shot in the arm for the American economy, though
adopting more American-style procedures would also be unlikely to
revive lagging EU economies.
So austerity is an ambivalent ground for procedural reform.
As with mass incarceration in America, it may provide the
stimulus to changes widely endorsed for other reasons, and it may
be ameliorated by those changes. But it may also be embraced as
a new argument for long-favored procedural changes even though
the changes really don't seem likely to solve the austerity
problem. Perhaps Professor Aviram is right that today's
austerity attitudes will provide an opportunity for tomorrow's
humanitarian arguments to succeed. At least the huge financial
cost of mass incarceration makes austerity a somewhat natural
argument even though distinctive from humanitarian concerns. But
more generally we may want to look askance at old arguments that
are now advanced under the banner of austerity if they don't
really seem connected to it.
V.

CONCLUSION -- HAPPY DAYS ARE NOT HERE YET

When he succeeded Ronald Reagan as Governor of California in
the 1970s, Jerry Brown was fond of saying that the US had reached
the 'era of limits.' As on many things, he was ahead of his time
on this subject because he saw what others only realized twenty
years later. Professor Pierson realized in the 1990s that
'permanent austerity' began in the 1970s,110 but the body politic
110
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did not realize what was happening, and it continued to favor
policies that now seem to assumed the post-war party would never
end. Now Brown is again Governor of California, and it seems
that many recognize that the era of limits has arrived. But even
that may change; in America we are told that the economy is
'adding jobs at the fastest pace since the boom of the late
1990s.'111
In Europe, the auguries are not so good. Questions about
austerity policies still produce great tension,112 although some
confrontations seem to have been averted.113 Other crises may
follow. Whatever the economic future holds, however, the
procedural future is likely to feel the ripple effects of
austerity for some time to come. Ultimately all societies must
acknowledge what Professor Zuckerman told us sixteen years ago -unlimited investment in procedure is not sustainable. The
organizers of this Congress have chosen their focus wisely, and
we may take these thoughts with us to the sessions that follow.
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